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Abstract
The pivotal role of the relation part-of in the descrip-
tion of living organisms is widely acknowledged. Or-
ganisms are open systems, which means that in con-
tradistinction to mechanical artifacts they are charac-
terized by a continuous ow and exchange of matter. A
closer analysis of the spatial relations in biological or-
ganisms reveals that the decision as to whether a given
particular is part-of a second particular or whether
it is only contained-in the second particular is often
controversial. We here propose a rule-based approach
which allows us to decide on the basis of well-dened
criteria which of the two relations holds between two
anatomical objects, given that one spatially includes
the other. We discuss the advantages and limitations
of this approach, using concrete examples from human
anatomy.
INTRODUCTION
Where the classical terminologies used in clinical
practice are characterized by taxonomic relationships,
the mereological (part-whole) organization of biomed-
ical ontologies has attracted increasing interest in re-
cent years. While taxonomies associate more specific
with more general classes, commonly expressed by the
relation is-a, partonomies associate parts to wholes,
or classes of parts to classes of wholes, by means
of mereological relations such as parthood, overlap
and disjointness. Large partonomic structures can
be found in several important biomedical ontologies
[7, 12, 11, 1, 10]. Most ontology engineering in the life
sciences thus far, however, has been realized in a rather
intuitive manner and a cognitive, concept-centered ap-
proach was given priority, chiefly motivated by a con-
cern for lexical relations between meanings. Certainly
such thesaurus-like systems are sufficient for many ap-
plications, e.g. for querying of terms and for the se-
mantic annotation of documents, but they are inade-
quate for more ambitious logic-based reasoning. Only
in this decade have more principled studies, based on
logic and formal ontology, investigated in detail the
biomedical parthood relation [15] and concluded that
the thesaurus-style usage of part-of relations is too in-
formal and leads to unreliable results when more so-
phisticated reasoning is required. If the basic part-of
relation is to be granted the status of a foundational
relation [2] in ontology, a more formal approach is
needed. As we shall show, however, assertions of part-
hood are tied to issues of human perception and belief,
and argue that, because of the problems which then
arise, the relation located-in would better serve as a
foundational relation in biomedical ontologies. At the
same time we are convinced that part-of nonetheless
deserves to play a central role in descriptions of living
organisms, and so we propose a cascading list of crite-
ria which can be used for asserting part-of relations in
different types of cases.
We refer throughout to relations which hold between
individuals and not between classes. Class-level part-
hood and spatial relations are very common in biomed-
ical ontologies (e.g. Part-Of (Thumb, Hand)), but they
can be formalized only via an approach that is based
on instance-level relations [14, 5].
A CASE STUDY
Alanine is a non-essential amino acid that is used by
the body to build protein. Consider some alanine
molecule in a human body. This molecule is, with-
out doubt, located in the body. But is it also part of
the body? Let us consider the following six scenarios
as concerns the destiny of an alanine molecule:
1. It is ingested as food ingredient and excreted by
feces without digestion.
2. It is ingested as food ingredient, digested and used
for albumin synthesis, some albumin is then excreted
with the urine.
3. It is ingested, metabolized and used for collagen
synthesis, thereby becoming integrated into the struc-
ture of a bone.
4. It is synthesized in the liver, built into a hemoglobin
molecule, and leaves the body by bleeding.
5. It is synthesized in the liver, built into a globulin
molecule, and then catabolized in a cell.
6. It is present in the zygote and the early embryo, and
then catabolized in the maternal organism.
Fig. 1 depicts these scenarios by means of space-time
diagrams. The grey areas represent the life cycles of
the respective organisms, the black areas the life cy-
cles of the corresponding single alanine molecule in
each of the different scenarios. Which scenarios allow
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Figure 1: Location of an alanine molecule (black)
within the organism (grey) over time
us to state that the alanine molecule is a part of the
body? In scenario (1) we may argue that it is not a part
but rather that it is only located in (i.e. contained in) a
cavity of the body. In (2) one may argue that it is part
at least for some time such as to form a part of some
protein (albumin) which is itself commonly regarded
as a body part. In (3) the molecule would most prop-
erly be seen as a constituent of the bone, and therefore
again as a part of the body. In (4) and (5), similarly,
because the molecule realizes a well-defined function
in a protein, we may tend to classify it as a part. And
so also in (6), where the molecule is included in rel-
evant biological objects at the very earliest stages of
their existence. Note that in none of these cases is the
molecule an essential part. That is it can in each case
be substituted by another object of the same kind, as
contrasted for example to the case of the brain.
PARTHOOD AND LOCATION
In order to express instance-level parthood relations
we follow the terminology in [15], using bold face for
relations between instances and italics for relations be-
tween classes. We use the reflexive, antisymmetric and
transitive relation part-of, which relates pairs of indi-
vidual objects, as in:
part-of(myThumb,myHand, t),
which means that my thumb is a part of my hand at the
time instant t. Indexing by time is necessary, since two
entities may be related by parthood only in a certain
phase of their simultaneous existence [8], as e.g. when
part-of(myThumb,myHand, t ′)
is not true for the instant t ′ because of amputation.
In a similar way we introduce location:
located-in(myBrain,mySkull, t)
means that at the time t my brain is located in my
skull. To understand location formally, we associate
with each physical object a spatial region and define
a function r which assigns to each anatomical entity c
and time t the corresponding spatial region r(c, t). This
spatial region is as a matter of definition exactly occu-
pied by c at time t. We can then define the relation of
location for anatomical entities as follows [6, 4]:
located-in(c,d, t) =de f part-of(r(c, t),r(d, t), t)
Trivially, by this definition, all parts of biological
structures are located-in the corresponding wholes but
not everything which is located somewhere in a biolog-
ical structure is also part-of that structure.
The cases in question are cases of containment, which
we define as follows:
contained-in(c,d, t) =de f
located-in(c,d, t)∧¬part-of(c,d, t)
Containment is a relation which obtains between a ma-
terial object (or portion of material substance such as
blood or urine), and some immaterial cavity or body
space. If the body space itself is part of a material
object, then objects located in this space are also con-
tained in that object, by our definition. Because bio-
logical objects are involved in a constant exchange of
matter with their environment many location relation-
ships are short-lived. Moreover, the continuous nature
of the phenomena of matter exchange [3], as illustrated
in the alanine example above, suggests that there may
be relations intermediate between parthood and con-
tainment, of the type illustrated in the alanine example
above.
CRITERIA FOR PARTHOOD
Under what condition, then, is an entity located-in
another entity also part-of this entity? Is an embryo
part-of, or merely located-in, a uterus? Is a bolus of
food part-of, or merely located-in, a digestive tract?
Is an oxygen molecule part-of, or merely located-in,
a lung? We here offer four kinds of criteria which
may be helpful in providing answers to such questions.
These criteria were elicited after an in-depth analysis
of 100 examples of medical and biological location
done by two of the authors.
1. Genetic identity: We introduce the relation
of genetic identity between two biological objects
(same-genetic-origin(c,d)), and assert that one object
is part-of another only if they stand in this relation. An
embryo, on this criterion, is not a part of its mother’s
uterus. This criterion, which is favored for example by
the FMA [12], faces problems in application to atoms
as well as to those portions of bodily samples such as
glucose, water, urea which are not gene products. A
strict application of this rule would further mean that
mitochondria are not parts of cells (since they have
their own DNA). This rule is also not sufficient to as-
sert parthood. It is of no help, for example, in deciding
whether a lymphocyte in a piece of tissue is part of this
tissue or is merely contained therein, or if an insulin
molecule attached to a receptor in a cell membrane is
or is not a part of this cell membrane. We therefore
state, taken into account that it is only applicable for c
and d which have a genetic origin:
located-in(c,d, t)∧¬same-genetic-origin(c,d)→
contained-in(c,d, t)
2. Sortality: If an object c is part of an object d, then c
and d must be of appropriate sorts to make this pos-
sible, i.e. they must instantiate compatible classes.
Thus if d is an instance of Organism, then it is ruled
out that c should be an instance of an artifact (e.g., a
heart pacemaker, a bullet, a dental filling), or that d
should be a second whole organism (a symbiont, par-
asite, prey, embryo or fetus). Similarly, if d is a non-
material object, then c cannot be a material object: my
brain is not part-of my cranial cavity.
3. Life Cycle: Unless this is already ruled out by sortal
constraints, c is part of d at t in the case that c is spa-
tially included in d at t and there is no time at which c
is not spatially included in d. For example, my brain
stem is for the given reason part of my brain. (See also
case 5 in Fig. 1.) More strictly, if c is located in d,
then c is also part of d whenever d’s existence with-
out cease with the removal of c. For this reason my
brain is part of my (living) body, and the surface of
my body is part of my body). This phenomenon of on-
tological dependence is already covered by the above
criterion. We should not, however, mix up this kind
of dependence on the level of individuals with generic
dependence. Thus every cell depends on some water
molecules in its cytoplasm. This means that the cell
cannot exist without some instances of the class water
molecule though it does not of course depend on some
one particular water molecule.
The main problem here is that such assertions of
parthood require that the whole lifecycle has been
recorded. Taking our example 6, this means that if
the zygote dies and the alanine molecule is still con-
tained in its cytoplasm then it would have been a
part-of the cytoplasm, otherwise it would have been
only located-in the cytoplasm.
In order to allow assertions during the exis-
tence of spatially related objects we add the
precondition earlier(t ′, t) and define the relation
hitherto-located-in(c,d, t) as follows:
hitherto-located-in(c,d, t) =de f
located-in(c,d, t)∧
¬∃t ′ : earlier(t ′, t)∧¬located-in(c,d, t ′)
Thus, the parthood criterion is:
hitherto-located-in(c,d, t)→ part-of(c,d, t)
The transitivity of part-of allows us to expand this cri-
terion to additional cases such as 3 in Fig. 1. Here,
the alanine molecule is located in the bone during the
whole period in which the bone exists. Since the bone
is part of the body, the alanine molecule is part of the
body as well.
4. Functionality/Integrity: The last criterion which
helps us to specialize located-in to part-of concerns
functionality and integrity. Again, we take two partic-
ular objects c and d, with c being located-in d. Let
c have a functionality f which is essential to d in the
sense that d becomes dysfunctional or even dies when
f cannot be realized. For example, the pumping func-
tion of the heart is essential to the functioning of the
cardiovascular system, just as the function of the col-
lection of hepatocytes is specific and essential to the
functioning of the liver. In contrast, the functioning
of one individual macrophage which happens to be
located-in some organ at some moment t is not es-
sential to the functioning of that organ. For the same
reason is the function of one given glucose molecule
in a cell not essential to the functioning of that cell.
The functionality criterion faces problems in applica-
tion to those parts of anatomical structures which are
spatially included in others but are not essential to the
proper functioning of the latter, or whose functional
relevance has disappeared during evolution. Examples
are: terminal hairs of the skin, nasal sinuses, or the
kidney and other organs supplied to the body in pairs.
A solution could be to expand the concept of function-
ing to that of integrity (or in other words, correspon-
dence to the canonical constitution of the organism).
If c located-in d then it would be part-of d whenever
the removal of c would affect the integrity of d. The
problem with such a definition is that it relies upon a
clear criterion of what integrity is: it requires a refer-
ence to what is understood by a well-formed biologi-
cal structure, e.g., a canonical description such as the
Foundational Model of Anatomy [12].
A precise formalization would largely exceed the
scope of this paper. We restrict ourselves to outline
the functionality / integrity criterion as follows:
function-integrity-relevant(c,d, t)∧
located-in(c,d, t)→ part-of(c,d, t)
A CLASSIFICATION ALGORITHM
Figure 2 depicts a semi-formal algorithm for the clas-
sification of a location relation in terms of parthood or
containment, by taking account of the above criteria.
Let us take some examples and consider how they are
treated by this algorithm:
If located-in (c, d, t)
If Artifact(c) then
contained-in(c, d, t)
Else
If function-integrity-relevant (c, d , t) then
part-of (c, d, t) 
Else
If not same-genetic-origin (c, d, t) or
(instance-of (c, Material) and 
instance-of (d, Immaterial)) then
contained-in (c, d, t)
Else
If hitherto-located-in (c, d, t) or 
(hitherto-located-in (c, m, t) and 
part-of (m, d, t)) then
part-of (c, d, t)
Else
contained-in (c, d, t)
End If
End If
End If
End If
End If
Figure 2: Algorithm for specializing located-in to
contained-in or part-of
Amalgam lling in a tooth: The filling is an artifact,
hence parthood is discarded in the first decision step.
A transplanted lung in an organism: The lung is now
functionally related to the organism, so parthood is ac-
cepted in the second decision step (in spite of the dif-
ference in genetic origin).
A ngernail in a nger: The fingernail has never been
outside the finger, hence it is part of the finger.
A portion of urine in a bladder: The two are not
functionally related (urine does not have any function
which is also a function of the bladder), and nor does
it have its origin in the bladder. Therefore the urine
portion is contained in the bladder but it is not a part
thereof.
A metastasis of a breast cancer in the brain: The
metastatic tumor is not functionally related to the brain
nor does it have its origin in the brain, since the cells
from which the metastasis originated migrated from
somewhere else into the brain. Therefore the origina-
tion criterion does not hold, and we conclude that the
metastasis is contained in the brain but is not part of it.
A glioblastoma in the brain: Again, the tumor is not
functionally related to the brain. But it has its ori-
gin therein, since the cells from which the metasta-
sis originated themselves originated from the brain.
Therefore the origination criterion can here be applied.
The glioblastoma is a part of a (pathologically altered)
brain.
An alanine molecule in the lumen of an intestine: The
molecule does not originate in the intestine, nor does
its function coincide with the function of the intestine.
Therefore it is contained in the intestine but is not a
part thereof.
An alanine molecule in a bone: The alanine molecule
is functionally essential for the collagen fiber it is in-
cluded in. It is therefore part of this collagen fiber. The
collagen fiber is synthesized within the bone, hence it
has its origin therein and thus the parthood relation can
be assumed between the fiber and the bone also. Due
to the transitivity of the parthood relation, the alanine
molecule is also part of the bone.
DISCUSSION
We will limit our discussion to two aspects, viz. the
analysis of borderline cases, and the relevance of the
above to ontology engineering.
The algorithm given in Fig. 2 suggests that we have
solved the problem of deciding between parthood and
containment once and for all. This, of course, is not
the case. However, it is not the fault of our rules, but
rather a consequence of certain underlying ontological
assumptions which are not in every case satisfied in a
clear-cut way. An example is the exact sortal delim-
itation between artifacts and biological matter, given
the existence of engineered tissue or genetically mod-
ified cells. To take the tumor example, one could ar-
gue as follows: a single malignant cell may not yet
be properly considered to be a metastasis, since one
might hold that the metastasis comes into being only
at the moment of the first cleavage of the tumor cell,
something that may occur already at the final location.
In this case, it becomes questionable whether the brain
metastasis is contained-in or is part-of the brain. This
is, however, a problem of identity (is the metastasis the
same entity as its originating cell or is it a different
one?) rather than of mereology. Another problem of
identity arises when considering defined volumes of
matter, e.g., the blood in my heart, or the air in your
lung. One may regard the volume of air in your lung
a continuant which preserves its identity across time
(despite the rapid exchange of its molecules). In this
case the function of the air would be as that of pre-
venting the lung from collapsing and thus assuring gas
exchange.
So far, our view has been limited to individual (to-
ken) objects [15]. Ontologies, however, generally deal
with types or classes of individuals. Whenever we
want to make assertions about classes, such as nger-
nail part-of nger, brain metastasis located-in brain,
then we must take care that for each and every indi-
vidual in the former class there exists some individ-
ual in the latter class related by a corresponding in-
stance level relations. The confusion between those
relations which hold between individual objects (such
as part-of) and their cognate relations which hold be-
tween classes of objects (part-of) has a long-standing
tradition and has only recently been clearly addressed
in the (bio)medical informatics community [13, 16].
We believe that it has still not been addressed in other
branches of informatics. The algorithm depicted in
Fig. 2 can therefore not be applied at the level of
classes of objects. Let us take the albumin exam-
ple. For each case the algorithm permits a clear state-
ment of whether located-in specializes to part-of or
contained-in. If we take, instead, the class of all ala-
nine molecules which are located-in human beings
and the class of all human beings, then we cannot
use our criteria precisely because there are some ala-
nine molecules which are merely contained (e.g., those
in the gatrointestinal tract) and others which are parts
(e.g. those within bones).
CONCLUSION
As a contribution to future bio-ontologies we rela-
tivized the role of the relation part-of and juxtaposed
it to the equally important contained-in relation (see
also [2]). Both relations are specializations of the rela-
tion located-in which relates all objects whose spatial
regions exhibit topological inclusion. We proposed an
algorithmic approach for specializing location to either
parthood or containment using four criteria: genetic
relation, type constraints, origination, and functional-
ity. We conclude that the algorithm is useful to support
the assignment of relations in describing biological or-
ganisms. An assessment of the cognitive adequacy of
this approach based on domain experts is in prepara-
tion. The limitations of our approach are mostly due
to vague boundaries between kinds, controversial con-
ceptualizations of the lifes of biological objects of dif-
ferent types and an imprecise understanding of biolog-
ical functionality, for which a well-founded ontologi-
cal account is still required [9].
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